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Abstract
There are important studies that have directly focused on how, in times of conflict, 
it is possible for previously law abiding people to commit the most atrocious acts of 
cruelty and violence. The work of Erich Fromm (Escape from Freedom), Hannah 
Arendt (Eichmann in Jerusalem), Zygmunt Bauman (Modernity and the Holocaust) 
and Ernest Becker (Escape from Evil) have all contemplated the driving force of 
aggression and mass violence to further our understanding of how people are capa‑
ble of engaging in extreme forms of cruelty and violence. This paper specifically 
addresses these issues by focusing on C. P. Taylor’s play Good. This provocative 
play examines how a seemingly ‘good’ and intelligent university professor can grad‑
ually become caught up in the workings of the Third Reich. Taylor highlights the 
importance of appreciating how people can be steadily incorporated into an ideo‑
logically destructive system. I argue that the theatre is a powerful medium to explore 
these complex issues. The audience of Good find themselves confronted with the 
following question—‘What would you have done?’
Keywords Authoritarianism · Banality · Cruelty · Violence · Nazism
1 Introduction
Hannah Arendt is well known for her work on banality, thoughtlessness and evil. 
Her report on the trial of the German Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann controversially 
asserted that Eichmann was not the ‘monster’ he was assumed to be. Arendt claimed 
that it would be more accurate to describe him as a ‘clown’ rather than a ‘monster’ 
[1, p.54]. Eichmann was an efficient bureaucrat who obediently followed orders. As 
a cog in a large bureaucratic machine, Arendt argued that he was able to distance 
and distract himself from the consequences of his actions. After observing his trial, 
Arendt decided that Eichmann was actually ‘terribly normal’. This is a terrifying 
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conclusion. This means there are many others just ‘like him’, who would also act 
with the same unscrupulous determination [1, p.276]. This paper makes connec‑
tions to Arendt’s work by examining Taylor’s play Good [2]. This powerful play pro‑
vides a fictional representation of how a very ‘normal’ university professor becomes 
enmeshed in the inner workings of the Third Reich. The paper examines the com‑
plexities and contradictions that accompany such a destructive personal transforma‑
tion. My overall intention is to highlight the continuing relevance of both Arendt 
and Taylor, who, in their own way, were both extremely concerned with what Waller 
[3] has described as the ordinariness of extraordinary evil.
2  The Banality of Evil
Research on extreme forms of mass violence and human suffering has shown how 
previously ordinary and reasonable people can commit atrocious acts of cruelty and 
violence [1, 3–7]. The question of how this transition occurs has been documented 
by a number of theorists. For example, Erich Fromm’s work on fascism detailed 
the social‑psychological benefits of identifying with Nazi ideology [8]. When peo‑
ple submit themselves to a powerful and all‑encompassing belief system they gain a 
sense of superiority over ‘others’ who remain unincorporated into the newly defined 
‘us’. Building on many of Fromm’s insights, Ernest Becker addressed the impor‑
tance of recognising how acts of cruelty and mass violence can be viewed by per‑
petrators as ‘necessary’ in order to create a more ‘desirable’ future [9, 10]. Becker’s 
research focused on the inter‑connections between idealism, mortality awareness, 
symbolic immortality and evil, and explored the importance of understanding the 
motivations behind the desire to create a ‘perfect’ society. Central to both Fromm 
and Becker is their insistence of the importance of conscious and unconscious moti‑
vation. People do not necessarily understand why they act in particular ways or why 
they have certain beliefs, values and desires. People can also deceive themselves 
about their own intentions. Fromm stated that it was Freud’s insights into the work‑
ings of the unconscious that opened up a vast ‘new world’ and taught him that ‘we 
are conscious of only a small part of ourselves’ [11, p.66]. Freud [12–15] believed 
that there are many parts of our beliefs, feelings, desires and behaviour that escape 
conscious awareness. In addition to this, he maintained that the unconscious allows 
people to repress deep feelings of guilt, hatred, aggression, envy and shame. Fromm 
and Becker shared Freud’s belief that people are not ‘gentle creatures’ who only 
‘defend themselves if they are attacked’ [16, p. 302]. The psychoanalytic work of 
Freud, Fromm and Becker has shown how people are capable of perpetrating ‘deeds 
of cruelty, fraud, treachery and barbarity’ that are ‘so incompatible with their level 
of civilization that one would have thought them impossible’ [17, p. 280].
Zygmunt Bauman has also been influenced by Freud and his sophisticated social 
analysis has incorporated Fromm and Becker’s psychoanalytic insights in relation 
to aggression, cruelty and violence. His work has been particularly influential to 
debates concerning mass violence and human suffering. In Modernity and the Holo-
caust he focused on how the Holocaust should be viewed as a specifically modern 
phenomena [18]. As Bauman argues:
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What we learned in this century is that modernity is not only about produc‑
ing more and travelling faster, getting richer and moving around more freely. 
It is also about – it has been about – fast and efficient killing, scientifically 
designed and administered genocide [19, p.193].
Whilst Bauman was fully aware of the importance of Fromm and Becker, his work 
can be seen as being particularly influenced by Hannah Arendt [1]. Arendt’s report 
on Eichmann showed how extensive documentation and bureaucracy protects people 
from having to confront the consequences of their actions and can facilitate mass 
murder. Arendt and Bauman argue that men and women can be responsible for the 
most inhuman and inexcusable actions ‘without feeling in the least inhuman them‑
selves’ [19, p. 197].
Arendt is especially known for her controversial arguments concerning banality 
and evil. In her book ‘Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil’, she 
argued that Eichmann, who was personally responsible for the logistical arrange‑
ments for the Final Solution, should be seen as a clown [1]. The man responsible for 
the deaths of millions of men, women and children was no more than a petty bureau‑
crat who prided himself on successfully following orders and detached himself from 
the consequences of his actions. As Arendt notes, he would have only ‘had a bad 
conscience’ if he had not successfully followed his orders ‘with great zeal and the 
most meticulous care’ [1, p. 25]. Eichmann was able to deceive himself and Arendt 
argues that self‑deception was a psychological survival strategy used by millions of 
people in Nazi Germany. Arendt understands evil as thoughtlessness. She claimed 
that Eichmann knew what he was doing, but that he did not think about his actions. 
Whilst Bauman is very supportive of Arendt’s work, he is critical of her approach to 
evil and thoughtlessness:
My quarrel with Hannah Arendt…concerns her thesis of the ‘banality of evil’. 
Arendt unpacks that baffling phrase as a charge of thoughtlessness: Eichmann 
was evil because he did not think. But it would be a hard task to prove Eich‑
mann’s thoughtlessness…Eichmann was a tremendously successful high‑rank‑
ing bureaucrat, showered with medals and prizes for the efficiency of his think‑
ing…Had Hitler emerged victorious from the war, universities would compete 
to have Eichmann among their teachers of managerial science. [20, p. 56].
Whilst Bauman is right to state that Eichmann was a thoughtful, ambitious and effi‑
cient bureaucrat, this does not completely undermine Arendt’s argument. Focusing 
on how to successfully follow orders allowed Eichmann to compartmentalise his 
behaviour and divert attention from the consequences of his actions. When Eich‑
mann researched the different methods of killing used by Nazi soldiers, including 
mass shootings and mobile gassing units, he was shocked by what he saw. It was 
all too much for Eichmann: ‘I hardly looked. I could not…I had had enough. The 
shrieking…I was much too upset’ [1, p. 87]. According to Erber, ‘Eichmann was 
appalled at what he saw. He could not bear the sights of people being loaded onto 
the gassing trucks’ and ‘went to the back of the line when the commander at Tre‑
blinka gave a demonstration of the gas chambers’ [21, p. 288]. Although he was 
fully aware his actions would result in the death of millions, on an everyday basis, he 
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did not have to witness the millions who were murdered. He could distract himself 
in the specific details of his tasks rather than fully acknowledging and contemplating 
the death and human suffering he was responsible for. Eichmann compartmental‑
ised mass murder. As Caswell has argued, the ‘essential distinction is not between 
knowing and not knowing’ about atrocities, the distinction is ‘between knowing and 
thinking’ [22, p. 22].
3  The Evil of Banality
The title of Minnich’s study of evil reverses the title of Arendt’s book, and she is 
well qualified to make this change. In The Evil of Banality [23] Minnich explains 
how she was Arendt’s teaching assistant during the controversy surrounding 
Arendt’s work on banality and evil. Minnich accompanied Arendt to many impas‑
sioned discussions and debates about the book. She was surprised by the amount of 
negative responses Arendt received: ‘it was not only that there was a lot of disagree‑
ment that struck me; it was how vitriolic and highly personalized it often was’ [23, 
p. 8–9]. The idea that Eichmann’s crimes could be described as banal, and that Eich‑
mann was not a monster, was too much for many people who attended her talks. The 
evil of the Holocaust was ‘unthinkable’. Contrasting this unspeakable horror with 
banality provoked a great deal of outrage. Minnich believed that much of this hostil‑
ity was understandable and could have been reduced if Arendt had talked about the 
evil of banality rather than the banality of evil:
Reflecting on Arendt’s work and its early reception by good people who were 
deeply pained, I found myself reversing her [in]famous phrase and, having 
done so, thinking that perhaps it would have helped had she spoken, as she did 
not, of the ‘evil of banality,’ rather than – or, as I now think, in addition to – 
‘the banality of evil’ [23, p. 9].
This change shifts attention to the many convenient everyday banalities that people 
rely on to distract themselves from being attentive and reflective about wider social, 
cultural, economic and political issues. It is possible to justify indifference and apa‑
thy. Conventional justifications include ‘it’s none of my business’ or ‘no‑one else is 
doing anything’ or ‘nothing I can do would make any difference’. Perhaps you ‘don’t 
want to put your head above the parapet’ or ‘lose the chance of being promoted at 
work’. There are many conventional ways people can justify their thoughtlessness 
and successfully avoid what Arendt described as thinking.
These conventional banalities are especially relevant when people are confronting 
what Minnich describes as extensive rather than intensive evil. This is an important 
distinction. Intensive evils refer to:
Great harms done by one or a few people. In that sense, they are contained: 
they stand in shuddering contrast with the lives others are leading around them 
in their times. When they burst into our lives, almost all of us are genuine 
spectators, not participants, not enablers, not perpetrators [23, p. 87].
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Examples of intensive evil include serial killers, rapists, murderers and terrorists. 
All of these crimes are terrifying and shocking to members of conventional society. 
They provoke outrage. But such horrific acts should not distract our attention from 
what Minnich refers to as extensive evil:
Extensive evil is not contained; it is widespread. It does not stand out in stark 
contrast to persistent ordinary lives, normally decent people; it is enabled by 
the turning of whole systems until it is ordinary to do terrible things, to ben‑
efit, or go on living as if ‘We didn’t know.’ Extensive evil requires that it be 
conventional to do its work as one’s job, daily, day after day after day after day, 
with supper at home and picnics on the weekend [23, p. 88].
Unlike intensive evils, extensive evils are enabled by familiar and conventional 
motivations including careerism, social conformity, fear and greed. These moti‑
vations are normalised by society and disseminate a ‘malignant normality’ [24]. 
Unlike intensive evil, extensive evil focuses on the many, not the few. Extensive evil 
‘requires that uncomfortable shift’ [23, p. 99]. These are ‘the massive, monstrous 
harms carried out by many, many people for significant periods of times – months, 
years, decades and more’ [23, p. 88].
4  The Continuum of Destruction
Extensive evil requires people to adapt and Staub’s research on the continuum of 
destruction is also important [7]. Staub examines how the accumulation of events 
can incorporate people into a destructive social system. Even ‘seemingly insignifi‑
cant acts’ such as the use of particular greetings, where to shop, or who you decide 
not to invite to a dinner party can legitimise and uncritically reinforce certain ide‑
ological beliefs. Staub identifies a gradual progression and highlights how people 
learn and subsequently change their beliefs and behaviour. As he states, ‘initial acts 
that cause limited harm result in psychological changes that make further destructive 
actions possible’ [7, p.17]. In addition to this, Staub draws attention to occurrences 
of ‘just‑world thinking’, a process that helps inoculate people from sympathising 
with the victims. People are able to rely on just‑world thinking to convince them‑
selves that bad things do not happen to good people. Just‑world thinking protects 
people from having to stand out from the crowd and encourages indifference. As 
bystanders and perpetrators learn to devalue and dehumanise victims, a reversal of 
morality can occur. Not only are deeply held beliefs concerning the welfare of others 
neglected, but a desire to hurt, humiliate and kill can be supported and encouraged. 
This reversal of morality urges perpetrators to ‘become more able and willing to act 
against victims’ and to develop a ‘powerful commitment to genocide or to an ideol‑
ogy that supports it’ [7, p.18].
Two important studies by Lifton [6, 25] clearly document how new group 
norms can emerge, and how perpetrators learn and dramatically change their 
beliefs and behaviour. His well‑known study of Vietnam veterans highlights 
how soldiers initially found themselves in an extremely frightening, confusing 
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and hostile environment [25]. The men were thrown into a world where extreme 
forms of brutality were normalised and celebrated. Examples of Staub’s ‘reversal 
of morality’ and ‘just‑world’ thinking are provided throughout Lifton’s work. In 
Vietnam it did not take long for the soldiers to adapt to the extreme callousness 
displayed toward the Viet Cong:
They quickly became aware of random killing: “If you can shoot artillery 
and bombs in there every night,” one of the men was quoted as saying, 
“how can the people in there be worth so much?” Still more graphic was 
the sight of a troop carrier driving by with “about twenty human ears tied to 
the antenna.” The men were at first shocked (“It was kind of hard to believe. 
They actually had ears on the antenna”), but not long afterwards some of 
the men, having spotted a few Vietcong and called in the artillery, came 
back with an ear of their own, to the approval of their commanding officer. 
Others began to mark their estimated kills with notches on their rifles. The 
imagery is that of the hunt. The ‘animals’ one shoots serve merely to pro‑
vide trophies, evidence of one’s prowess.
[25, p. 44–45].
Another difficult, insightful and disturbing study is provided by Lifton’s 
research on Nazi doctors [6]. This study further documents how people can learn 
to accept and justify the most extreme forms of human cruelty. The doctors who 
worked in the Nazi concentration camps played a vital role as they were responsi‑
ble for selecting who should be sent to the gas chambers. The doctors determined 
the amount of gas to be used and would ensure that all the people in the chamber 
had been killed. In addition to this, the doctors were responsible for giving lethal 
injections and carrying out medical experiments on prisoners. Lifton’s research 
documents the initial shock doctors experienced when they first arrived at Aus‑
chwitz. It is both troubling and surprising how quickly the doctors adapted to this 
environment. Lifton describes how doctors experienced an ‘extraordinary indi‑
vidual‑psychological shift from revulsion to acceptance’ [6, p. 195]. The malig‑
nant Auschwitz environment forced the doctors to adapt: ‘In the beginning’, one 
of the doctors stated, ‘it was almost impossible. Afterward it became almost rou‑
tine. That’s the only way to put it’ [6, p. 195]. Various justifications and ration‑
alistions were used by the doctors to ‘minimize psychological discomfort and 
responsibility’ [6, p. 213]. For example, many doctors convinced themselves that 
the gas chambers actually saved the inmates from unnecessary suffering. Another 
strategy involved the doctors focusing their attention on the technical problems 
involved in the killing process. The doctors were concerned about making the 
killing as ‘humane’ and ‘efficient’ as possible. Lifton shows how the personal 
‘transition from feeling to not feeling’ was both ‘rapid and radical’:
In discussing patterns of diminished feeling, Ernst B [an SS doctor] told me 
that it was the “key” to understanding what happened in Auschwitz. In also 
pointing out that “one could react like a normal human being in Auschwitz 
only for the first few hours,” he was talking about how anyone entering the 
place was almost immediately enveloped in a blanket of numbing. [6, p. 443].
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The doctors socialisation to Auschwitz ensured their responsibilities became 
routinized. Lifton’s research directly examines how it was possible for doctors 
to work in this unspeakably cruel environment and still be able to return home 
as loving husbands and fathers. Lifton documents the psychological transitions 
that enabled SS doctors to adapt and how they developed what he terms the ‘Aus‑
chwitz self’. As he states, the Auschwitz self ‘so violated the Nazi doctor’s previ‑
ous self‑concept as to require more or less permanent disavowal [6, p.422]. The 
Auschwitz self allowed doctors to avoid ‘feelings of guilt’ so they could ‘engage 
in medicalized killing, an ultimate form of numbed violence’ [6, p.442].
5  C.P. Taylor’s Good
Many of the themes addressed in the work of Arendt, Bauman, Minnich, Staub 
and Lifton are explored in Taylor’s play Good [2]. This remarkable play, set in 
pre‑war Germany, focuses on an unassuming and well‑intentioned university pro‑
fessor who becomes fully enmeshed in the internal workings of the Third Reich. 
The main protagonist is John Halder. He is in his early forties and is a lecturer in 
German literature. Halder is married with three children, works in Frankfurt and, 
most importantly, has written a novel about euthanasia. This novel is based on his 
personal experiences with his Mother’s senile dementia. One of Halder’s most val‑
ued relationships is with Maurice, who Halder describes as his best friend. Maurice 
is a Jewish doctor. He trusts Maurice and openly talks to him about his personal 
problems and concerns. One of Halder’s main problems is that whenever he contem‑
plates difficult problems, his thoughts are accompanied by the sound of band music:
HALDER (to the audience) The bands came in 1933. So you can’t say they 
came with the rise of the Nazis, exactly. The Nazis were on the rise long before 
that. To some extent, it was a device that was with me from childhood. Bring‑
ing music into the dramatic moments of my life. But from’33, they became an 
addiction. Jazz bands…café bands…tenors…crooners…symphony orchestras. 
Depending on the particular situation and my mood. [2, p. 1].
Halder is desperate to overcome his anxiety neurosis to improve his relationships 
both at work and with his family. He asks Maurice for advice and acknowledges his 
neurosis may be a survival strategy, a psychological defence mechanism that turns 
‘reality into fantasy’. Different types of music accompany Halder during the most 
tragic moments of his life and this anxiety neurosis distracts him from directly con‑
fronting the reality of each situation.
As I will later explain, the accompanying music becomes particularly significant 
at the end of the play. Throughout the play there are many competing, fragmented 
memories that Halder has about his wife, mother, children, girlfriend, Maurice and 
Nazi officials including Eichmann. These scenes run concurrently and interrupt one 
another, but essentially this is a play about the Holocaust and the rationalisation of 
evil. The play invites the audience to reflect on Halder’s stream of consciousness 
and to consider the escalating commitments that lead to his dramatic transformation.
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At the start of the play we learn that Halder is someone who is very critical of the 
Nazi party. However, his novel on euthanasia captures the attention of Nazi Officials 
as it is recognised that Halder’s support would provide credibility to Hitler’s plans 
for racial purification. During a secret meeting with Over‑Leader Bouller, Halder is 
informed that his novel has caught the attention of Doctor Goebbels, and that Goeb‑
bels himself was impressed by the novel. Even Hitler has read his novel and Halder 
is shown where Hitler had scribbled ‘written from the heart’ in the margins of his 
book. Halder’s work is recognised and valued. In the role of a consultant, he is asked 
to write a paper that examines similar themes to his novel. The paper would need to 
justify the necessity of mercy killings and explain how this method of treating the 
‘incurable’ and ‘insane’ is both compassionate and humane. Halder is persuaded and 
agrees to write this paper. As a consequence, Halder is offered new career oppor‑
tunities, starts to question his previous views about Nazi ideology and eventually 
rationalises atrocities. The following scenes from the play, many involving events 
that took place in Nazi Germany, inform Halder’s changing beliefs and rationalisa‑
tions. Rather than providing a detailed synopsis of the play, my intention is to iden‑
tify key scenes that capture Halder’s personal transformation.
5.1  Halder’s Decent into Hell
At the start of the play both Halder and his friend Maurice are very sceptical of 
Hitler. Maurice knows Germany relies on ‘Jewish brains’ and states that Hitler is 
‘bound to drop all that racial shit they had to throw around to get their votes’ [2, p. 
6]. Although, in his more rational moments, Maurice does not believe Hitler will fol‑
low through on his anti‑Semitic programme, he is still extremely worried. Maurice 
is not at all confident that Hitler fully understands the impracticality of his ideologi‑
cal beliefs. Whatever happens, Maurice knows Halder will be able to continue living 
a safe and secure life. Here we have two friends who find themselves in very differ‑
ent circumstances. Even if Hitler pursues his anti‑Jewish progamme, Halder could 
still live in Frankfurt, work as a professor or even become the Vice Chancellor of 
the University. Unlike his friend, Maurice is now forced to live with unprecedented 
levels of uncertainty and anxiety. Halder tries to reassure Maurice. He tells him not 
to worry about the propaganda. Hitler’s racialist programme is not at all practical:
HALDER: I’ll get you a drink, Maurice…Relax…You’re right…All that anti‑
Jew rubbish…You’re right…Just balloons they throw up in the air to distract 
the masses…You’re right.
MAURICE: I know I’m bloody right. I’m telling you…But my bloody anxiety 
neurosis has fixed on to it…and I can do shit all about it…
[2, p. 6–7].
Taylor is right to emphasise this particular attitude. In the gradual build up to 
Hitler taking power many respected commentators, including the French ambas‑
sador Andre Francois‑Poncet, remained critical of Hitler and did not take him 
too seriously. Like Halder, Francois‑Poncet was not particularly worried and 
thought Hitler’s influence was declining [26]. It is also worth noting that in 1933 
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Jean‑Paul Sartre was living in Berlin, studying the philosophy of Husserl. Even 
though this was only nine months after Hitler was elected, Sartre was ‘not par‑
ticularly sensitive’ to Hitler’s rise to power, and was busy studying phenomenol‑
ogy amidst street demonstrations and increasing levels of violence [26, p. 97]. 
When asked about his time living in Berlin, despite acknowledging the Nazi pres‑
ence, he still described this time as ‘a very happy year’ [27, p. 26]. In 1933 there 
were many journalists and political commentators who believed that Hitler would 
soon disappear from the political arena [26].
5.2  Joining the Nazi Party
Halder does not think Maurice should be overly concerned about the Nazi propa‑
ganda, and like Maurice, he is also very critical of Nazi ideology. But Halder is 
soon pressurised by his wife Helen, and his father‑in‑law, to join the Nazi party. 
Helen urges Halder to join, to ensure all the family are safe. She states that her 
father intends to talk to him about joining the National Socialists. Not only would 
his university career be thwarted, but according to Helen’s father, he may even 
lose his lectureship at the university if he decided not to join the party. Although 
he has reservations, Halder reveals his decision to Helen:
HELEN: I assumed, in the end, you’d be sensible.
HALDER: I’m doing it because I love you…you know that. If it was just 
myself, I’d take a chance. I’m not one hundred per cent sure about Hitler…
you understand that…I love you and the children…
[2, p.19].
In another scene with Anne (student/girlfriend) he takes a different approach to 
justify this decision. Halder explains that Hitler may think that Germany should 
exclude the Jewish population, but ‘in reality’, Jewish scientists, doctors, chem‑
ists and capitalists are all part of German culture. Perhaps, he suggests, people 
like himself and Anne actually have a responsibility to join the party:
HALDER. It’s not only survival, is it? Joining the Nazis. If people like us 
join them…instead of keeping away from them, being purist…And pushed 
them a bit towards humanity…Is that kidding yourself?
ANNE. What if they push us the other way?
HALDER. Yes…it could happen…Yes…If it did…I’d get out…No question 
about it…I’d pull myself away…I’d get out of the country…We’d get out of 
the country…
[2, p. 26].
Halder decides to join the party to protect his family and further justifies his 
decision as an attempt to shift the party to a more reasonable and humane posi‑
tion. Maurice remains entirely unsympathetic:
MAURICE: You joined the Nazis! You…For fuck’s sake.
HALDER: I told you I joined the Nazis…
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MAURICE: The reality is coming to me…Jesus…Johnnie…God in heaven.
[2, p. 17].
5.3  The Nazi Book Burning
On the 10th May 1933 one of the most famous Nazi book burnings took place in 
Opernplatz, Berlin. The book burnings were organised by the National Union of 
Students who decided to take action against what they considered to be ‘un‑German’ 
books. Ritualised ceremonies with speeches and light processions occurred through‑
out Germany. In Opernplatz over 25,000 books believed to be contaminating the 
German spirit were set on fire by students, professors and members of paramilitary 
organisations [28]. Many famous national and international authors were targeted 
including Sigmund Freud, Heinrich Heine, Ernest Hemmingway, Hermann Hesse, 
Jack London, Thomas Mann, Karl Marx, Robert Musil and Leo Tolstoy.
In the play, the SS Major known as Freddie informs Halder that he has a new 
order for him. Freddie is apologetic. As Halder is a university lecturer, he does not 
think Halder will approve. Halder reads the order and learns that he has to organise 
a book burning ceremony at the university. Freddie knew Halder had ‘deep feelings 
about books’ and believed the order would ‘cut him deeply’ [2, p. 38]. However, 
rather than being critical, Halder remains optimistic:
HALDER (to himself): There’s a positive aspect to all this. You’ve got to make 
a supreme effort and look positively…One of the basic defects of university 
life is learning from books. Not from experience…Life…involvement…com-
mitment…agony and panic at being thrown into the storm that’s the human 
condition…
FREDDIE. Mind, I can see what they’re getting at, burning Freud’s filthy shit. 
Pervert isn’t he? Tried to make out everybody’s as twisted and perverted as he 
is!
HALDER (to himself): If you looked at it from the philosophical standpoint, 
that the burning is symbolic of a new healthy approach to university learn‑
ing…Man does not live by books alone.
[2, p. 38–39].
Even though Halder has read and respects some of the authors on the list of books 
to be burned, he rationalises the event by viewing it symbolically. He informs Fred‑
die that he will not be burning his own copies. For Halder, the book burning cer‑
emony represents a new start, an existential challenge to the traditional pedagogical 
approach to learning. This is a ceremony that will celebrate a different approach to 
teaching and learning and will unlock new opportunities for Germany.
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5.4  The Night of Broken Glass
The Night of Broken Glass, another key scene of the play, describes the violence 
directed against the Jews on November 9, 1938. This event, known as Kristallnacht, 
was named to reflect the amount of shattered glass on the streets of Germany. 
Organised by Joseph Goebbels, this violence was directed against both Jewish busi‑
nesses and Jewish people. Over the course of two days over 7000 businesses were 
vandalised and looted, 250 synagogues were attacked and burnt and Jews were 
killed. Jewish homes, schools and cemeteries were targeted. Despite the mass vio‑
lence and fires, the police and fire brigades did not intervene. Directly after the vio‑
lence, around 30,000 Jewish men were arrested and taken to concentration camps, 
and the remaining Jewish population had to abide by strict curfews that restricted 
their freedom of movement. After Kristallnacht businesses managed by Jews were 
forced to cease trading. The Jewish population were now systematically stigmatised 
and segregated from all areas of everyday life in Germany [29].
In the play Halder is conflicted and troubled by the violence. He knows that Jews 
will be attacked and arrested and that houses, businesses and synagogues will be tar‑
geted. As Halder states, there are ‘roughnecks in the Party’ and ‘Excesses are bound 
to happen’ [2, p. 57]. Whist he knows that targeting a racial group is ‘not a good 
thing’, Halder thinks it is necessary to look at this violence ‘in perspective’. Halder 
convinces himself that the violence is necessary:
HALDER. I see tonight…As a basically humane action…it’s going to shock 
the Jews into the reality of their situation in Nazi Germany…Tomorrow morn‑
ing…They’ll be running for their lives out of the country.
…A sharp, sudden shock…that is going to make those who still delude them‑
selves that they can stay here in peace to face reality…
[2, p. 57].
Halder justifies the violence as this will alert Jews to the seriousness of their situ‑
ation. At the same time he is also becoming very critical of the Jews for not taking 
responsibility for their own lives and leaving the country. At this stage of the play he 
has abandoned his friend Maurice. Maurice asks Halder to obtain the necessary exit 
papers for him so he can leave Germany:
MAURICE. Get me these exit papers, then, Nazi cunt! Fucking do something 
about this fucking great friendship, then for fuck’s sake!
[2, p. 32].
Halder refuses. Despite their friendship, he is not willing to take the risk of being 
sent to prison. He has too many people depending on him. Recognising that Halder 
will not help with the exit papers, Maurice asks him to buy five train tickets to Swit‑
zerland instead. Halder refuses to buy the tickets and reminds Maurice he is an SS 
officer. Once again, Halder tries to reassure Maurice that ‘this is a temporary racist 
aberration’ and that no‑one ‘takes that metaphysical racialist rubbish in Mein Kampf 
seriously’ [2, p. 48]. Maurice no longer believes him. He knows new laws are about 
to be introduced. He also realises that Halder is not prepared to help him.
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5.5  At the gates of Auschwitz
Towards the end of the play Halder has a meeting with Eichmann. Eichmann com‑
ments on how Halder has been an ‘excellent comrade’ as both a ‘university man’ and 
a ‘compassionate’ S.S. officer. He states that he would like Halder to work closely 
with him. His responsibilities would involve writing reports about the ‘leadership, 
morale…amenities’ and ‘the general situation’ at some of the concentration camps. 
Eichmann needs a reliable report that evaluates ‘the recommendations for the pro‑
cessing of the diseased and the unfit’ [2, p. 64]. He also expects Halder to report on 
any ‘unnecessary cruelty’ or ‘sadistic behaviour’ that could have ‘a disastrous effect 
on the general level of discipline’ [2, p. 64]. Eichmann informs Halder that a sab‑
batical has been arranged for him so he can carry out this work away from the uni‑
versity. Halder agrees to write a report for Eichmann. In the final scene of the play 
Halder arrives at Auschwitz and is greeted by the camp commandant Hoss:
HALDER (to the audience): He showed no emotion. That was it. Might have 
been some mental condition. On the other hand, just stress…the poor bastard 
had a hell of a job…He did make a supreme effort and smiled.
The funny thing was…I heard this band. Playing a Schubert March. ‘Oh,’ I 
registered to myself. ‘We’re having Schubert, now.’
…Then I became aware that there was in fact a group of prisoners…Maybe in 
my honour. I’m not sure…The important thing was…The significant thing: the 
band was real.
Up band…HALDER watching them…
…The band was real!
[2, p. 69].
Throughout the play Halder’s problems and dilemmas have been accompanied 
by imaginary bands. A tenor may suddenly appear in his office, a band or a jazz 
trio may start playing and such music interrupts and accompanies some of the main 
scenes in the play. At the end of the play, Halder is standing in his SS uniform with 
Hoss at the gates of Auschwitz. This is where the music in his imagination stops. 
This powerful concluding scene draws attention to how both amateur and profes‑
sional musicians played concerts at Auschwitz. Although musicians could organise 
concerts for the other prisoners, they were mainly forced to play concerts for the 
S.S. officers. They could also be forced to play during public punishments, execu‑
tions and the so‑called selection process [30]. In this final scene the illusory musi‑
cians who constantly disturb Halder’s existence are replaced by a real orchestra. The 
imaginary musicians that psychologically protected Halder from having to face real‑
ity have been replaced. The psychological mechanism that transformed reality into a 
fantasy has ensured that his personal fantasies have become reality.
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6  Discussion
Good is an extraordinarily powerful play. Whilst there are many different, inter‑
weaving and fragmented narratives, the examples cited above are all significant 
and capture Halder’s transformation. In his meeting with Over‑Leader Bouller, 
Halder is flattered by the attention and praise his novel on euthanasia has received 
from both Dr Goebbels and Hitler. He is seen as an important academic who has 
the ability to discuss complicated moral questions. He is also reassured about 
the intentions of the Party, as his work is valued for being compassionate. After 
agreeing to write a paper on the necessity of mercy killings, Halder is gradually 
drawn deeper within the workings of the Nazi party. Later in the play, Eichmann 
flatters Halder by stating that he needs a report on the concentration camps that 
he can trust. Taking a similar approach to Bouller, Eichmann reassures Halder’s 
conscience by explaining that they are not ‘monsters’ and that he requires an hon‑
est report that would include accounts of any cruelty. As Eichmann states, he 
wants ‘the same human, without sentimentality approach’ [2, p. 64] that Halder 
has become known for. Halder agrees to work for Eichmann and this justifies the 
final dramatic scene with Hoss at the gates of Auschwitz. At the beginning of 
the play Halder is a lecturer in German literature who has written a novel about 
euthanasia. By the end of the play Halder is an SS officer working for Eichmann 
at Auschwitz.
There are significant changes in the way Halder views the beliefs of the Nazi 
party and the increasing violence against the Jewish population. At the start of 
the play he is critical of Hitler and the Nazi party. Although he decides to join the 
party, he does so reluctantly, mainly under the relentless pressure from his wife 
and father‑in‑law. But this is not enough. He needs to have his own personal rea‑
son to join the party. This is reflected in his discussion with his girlfriend Anne. 
If more people like ‘us’ joined, Halder reasoned, then all the anti‑Jewish propa‑
ganda would be abandoned. Later on in the play, it is Anne who is reassuring 
Halder, as she helps him into his SS uniform for his duties during Kristallnacht. 
The Party did not abandon their anti‑Jewish agenda, and Halder and Anne are not 
leaving the country, as they previously said they would. Indeed their own guilt 
about the plight of the Jews is somewhat avoided as they have both started to 
blame the Jews. Kristallnacht is viewed by Halder as a humane action as the vio‑
lence will alert all the remaining Jews that they really do need to leave Germany. 
The violence is justified.
His relationship with his best friend Maurice further documents Halder’s trans‑
formation. At the beginning of the play Halder is critical of Nazi ideology. Of 
course, unlike Maurice, Halder is in a very different position as his life is not under 
threat from the anti‑Jewish programme. Halder tries to reassure Maurice that their 
analysis is right, and that Hitler is bound to ‘drop’ all the anti‑Jewish propaganda. 
Here we can assume that Halder is being honest. As I have discussed, in the early 
1930s many political commentators believed that Hitler’s influence would decline. 
Nevertheless, Halder continues to try to reassure Maurice when it is very clear that 
his life is under threat. Rather than deliberately lying to Maurice, he has started to 
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deceive himself. Halder is defending himself from a truth he cannot face. Even when 
it is clear that new legislation is about to be passed, Halder still maintains that Hit‑
ler will not survive. However, Halder is not entirely convinced by his own decep‑
tions. At the same time as providing reassurance, Halder is having his own personal 
doubts. His internal dialogue constantly shifts and contradicts his advice to Mau‑
rice. His attempts to deceive himself are not enough to combat his reoccurring panic 
and doubt. He still panics and questions himself about whether Germany has been 
turned into a prison. He still occasionally thinks about the possibilities of leaving the 
country. Towards the end of the play his self‑deceptions are reinforced by placing 
blame directly on the Jewish population. Anne both shares and fortifies this view:
ANNE. In any case, for God’s sake…If I was Jewish I’d have got out of here 
years back…The first year Hitler was in power…Any Jew with sense is out by 
now…The ones that are left must be utterly stupid or desperate to hang on to 
their property…What are they doing staying in Germany?
HALDER. Listen. You’re so clever. You’re right. Everything you say is so log‑
ical and true.
[2, p. 62–63].
Halder now believes the Jews should have left Germany when they still had a 
chance to leave. After Halder agrees to write a report on the concentration camps 
for Eichmann, Maurice appears in one of Halder’s imaginary bands. Halder speaks 
to the audience and states that Maurice had disappeared ‘months ago’. But Maurice 
is now there in front of him conducting a choir. He wants to talk to Maurice. He tells 
Maurice that the Jews are responsible for pushing Germany into this situation. Mau‑
rice responds: What’s he saying? What is this shithead talking about? It’s my fault, 
his fucking machine‑guns mowed me down? [2, p.66]. In this last scene between 
Halder and Maurice, despite blaming the Jews for creating such a nightmare in Ger‑
many, Halder says he forgives Maurice.
Throughout the play Halder is reassured he is a good person. Whether it is in 
conversation with Eichmann, Bouller, Maurice, Helen or Anne, he likes to be seen 
as a ‘good’, caring and compassionate person. He also has difficult discussions with 
Maurice and has serious doubts as to whether he is making the right decisions. Hal‑
der is not an evil, cruel, unremorseful psychopath. As Arendt would argue, Halder, 
just like Eichmann, is terrifyingly normal:
The trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that 
the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, ter‑
ribly and terrifyingly normal. From the viewpoint of our legal institutions and 
of our moral standards of judgement, this normality was much more terrifying 
than all the atrocities put together, for it implied…that this new type of crimi‑
nal…commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well‑nigh impos‑
sible to know or to feel that he is doing wrong [1, p. 276].
Halder is certainly not sadistic and in this respect he can be viewed as belonging 
to the ‘new’ type of criminal described by Arendt. Halder’s reports developed a rep‑
utation that impressed the top echelons of the Nazi Party. His decisions ultimately 
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increased his job security and social status. Towards the end of the play it is clear 
that he has taken a Jewish professor’s job at the university and lives in a large house. 
Nevertheless, Halder’s circumstances did not alleviate his reoccurring doubt and 
uncertainty, and it was certainly not ‘well‑nigh impossible’ for Halder to feel that he 
was ‘doing wrong’. Halder is constantly panicking and doubting himself. His inter‑
nal dialogues are often contradictory, at times he ‘loves’ the Jews, at other times he 
blames the Jews. Indeed, throughout the play he is confronted by imaginary bands 
precisely because of the difficult problems he is forced to confront. Halder compart‑
mentalises his behaviour and relies on the everyday conventional banalities identi‑
fied by Minnich [23]. But Arendt is right to highlight the necessity of self‑deception. 
Whether it was joining the Nazi party, writing reports for Bouller and Eichmann, 
organising a book burning at the university, or betraying his friend Maurice, Halder 
is always attempting to rationalise his behaviour to demonstrate to himself and to 
others that his intentions are reasonable, understandable and ultimately good. Yet 
Halder never seems totally persuaded by his rationalisations, and feelings of doubt, 
panic and guilt are never far from the surface. The final scene between Anne and 
Halder captures this uncertainly. Anne is trying to reassure Halder: ‘Whatever hap‑
pens’, she states, ‘However we get pushed…I know we’re good people…both of us’. 
‘Yes’, Halder replies ‘We probably are…good…Yes…Whatever that means. [2, p. 
68].
7  Conclusion
Good is a play about an ordinary university professor who gradually becomes a 
committed Nazi. As Freud rightly noted, atrocious ‘cruelties and injustices’ can 
occur in ‘the most civilized nations’, and as this play demonstrates, perpetrators will 
often display ‘a general lack of insight’ into the nature of ‘their own lies and wrong‑
doings’ [17, p. 301–302]. Whilst Good is directly about Nazi Germany, the impor‑
tance of the play is clearly not restricted to that particular period of time. We may 
live in highly cultured and liberal societies, but we also have to live with the unset‑
tling knowledge that extreme forms of violence and intolerance can rapidly become 
normalised. The malignant normality of extensive evil could yet again return to per‑
vade our everyday lives. And the perpetrators are not likely to be the easily distin‑
guishable evil perpetrators we may assume them to be. Although in the final scene 
of the play Halder is working at Auschwitz, he is not a sadist or an uncontrollable 
and vindictive psychopath. As Arendt would argue, it is far worse than that. Hal‑
der is actually terrifyingly normal. Reflecting on his interviews with Nazi doctors, 
Lifton [6] commented on the distressing normality of his interviewees. Even though 
there is nothing psychologically ‘darker or more menacing, or harder to accept, than 
the participation of physicians in mass murder’ [6, p. 3], he found that Nazi doctors 
could be polite and amicable. Lifton admitted to struggling with this throughout his 
research:
What I have struggled with throughout this study‑is the disturbing psycho‑
logical truth that participation in mass murder need not require emotions as 
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extreme or demonic as would seem appropriate for such a malignant project. 
Or to put the matter another way, ordinary people can commit demonic acts [6, 
p.5].
The first Nazi doctor he interviewed greeted him in a friendly way and he could 
remember feeling that it was pleasant to spend time with this ‘likeable’ man. He 
remembers being immediately horrified by his thoughts and having to remind 
himself that ‘this bastard is one of them!’ [31, p. 263]. Lifton found it hard to 
accept that it is not only ‘monsters who perpetrate monstrous deeds’ [32, p. 23]. 
It is this disturbing realisation that explains why Taylor’s play is so powerful and 
provocative. The play forces the audience to ask questions about social conform‑
ity, fear, social status, loyalty, friendship and personal responsibility. The theatre 
is an important medium for exploring these issues as the audience are encouraged 
to assess what choices they would have made in Halder’s situation. The ‘lesson to 
be learned’, Taylor argued, and what the play directly reveals, is that the atrocities 
of the Third Reich are not to be explained as a ‘simple conspiracy of criminals 
and psychopaths’. The atrocities are rather ‘the result of the infinite complexity of 
contemporary human society’ [33].
Good is not a play about monsters or psychopaths. Good is also not a play 
about automatons who are able to function as well‑oiled cogs in the machine. 
Throughout the play Halder is troubled by his actions. Despite his increasingly 
sophisticated excuses and rationalisations, Halder constantly doubted himself. 
Even after he started to blame the Jews for their own predicament, there are still 
glimmers of insecurity and doubt concerning the validity of his arguments. As his 
commitments to the Nazi regime escalated, his rationalisations served an impor‑
tant psychological function. They did not completely remove his uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, they were convincing enough for him not to resist or attempt to 
flee the country. They were persuasive enough not to risk helping his best friend. 
They were strong enough to say ‘yes’ to both Bouller and Eichmann. His ration‑
alisations to excuse the inexcusable were also credible enough to believe he was 
‘probably’ still a good person.
The play challenges the view that perpetrators are guilty of thoughtless‑
ness. Bauman was right to critique Arendt by emphasising that Eichmann was 
a highly successful bureaucrat. High‑ranking officials are likely to be ambitious 
and thoughtful individuals who value efficiency and innovation. As Vetlesen [34] 
argues, Arendt assumed that thinking was necessarily good. She did not explore 
the connections that exist ‘between thinking and evildoing’. She did not consider 
the hypothesis ‘that thinking may actively side with, or even produce, evil’ [34, 
p. 60]. Whilst this is an important criticism of Arendt, these arguments do not 
invalidate her claims in relation to thoughtlessness. They do, however, suggest 
that Arendt should have been more precise. Arendt was specifically focusing 
on how Eichmann distracted himself from reflecting on and thinking about the 
consequences of his actions. In the play Halder is certainly thinking. He makes 
decisions, attends meetings, writes reports, and creates defensive rationalisations. 
Being thoughtful, in this more general sense of the term, can certainly be respon‑
sible for evil. Yet Halder was trying, and not always succeeding, to avoid thinking 
1 3
Mass Violence and the Continuum of Destruction: A study of C.…
about the victims of Nazi ideology. His rationalisations were important defensive 
strategies to assist his own self‑deception. As Arendt maintained, this is a key 
psychological survival strategy. Halder could not be accused of thoughtlessness, 
but he was able to distract himself. He did not have to think too deeply about the 
full consequences of his actions.
To conclude it is worth remembering Bruno Bettelheim’s pessimistic warning. 
Bettelheim, himself a survivor of Dachau and Buchenwald concentration camps, 
analysed the behaviour of his fellow prisoners. He was determined to learn about 
how people react to such extreme situations. He argued that when people are placed 
under great stress, ‘most people are neither heroes or martyrs’. Unfortunately, when 
placed in these circumstances, most people ‘deteriorate rather rapidly’ [35, p. 
261– 262]. A similar point is emphasized by Snyder:
Most of us would like to think that we possess a ‘moral instinct’. Perhaps we 
imagine that we would be rescuers in some future catastrophe. Yet if states 
were destroyed, local institutions corrupted, and economic incentives directed 
towards murder, few of us would behave well. There is little reason to think 
that we are ethically superior to the Europeans of the 1930s and 1940s, or 
for that matter less vulnerable to the kind of ideas that Hitler so successfully 
promulgated and realised [36, p. 320].
Taylor’s play successfully questions whether we would be the ‘rescuers’ we like 
to imagine ourselves to be. Good encourages the audience to contemplate the ‘ordi‑
nariness of extraordinary evil’. This is an important and necessary shift. Understand‑
ing the ordinariness of evildoing means that ‘we will be less surprised by evil’ and 
hopefully ‘better equipped to forestall evil’ [3, p. 297]. Of course, it is ‘unbearably 
difficult’ to see the potential ‘for evil within ourselves’ [32, p. 7]. Good is a remark‑
able play as it forces us to do just that. It is uncomfortable. It is also necessary. As 
Waller has argued, understanding ‘our own capacity for evil…is the best safeguard 
we can have against future genocides and mass killings’ [3, p. xvii].
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